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Comments on Warren Grimes: 
Transparency in Federal Antitrust 
Enforcement 
ROBERT PITOFSKYt 
Transparency in government process-primarily fair 
and responsive explanations of government action and 
inaction-is an important issue. Professor Warren Grimes's 
article addresses this topic and explains in detail why 
transparency matters.l In particular, he emphasizes that 
merger enforcement has become the predominant 
government enforcement activity in the antitrust field. It is 
increasingly a matter of bureaucratic judgments because 
relatively few mergers are challenged in court, and almost 
all are settled with a restructuring consent order or 
abandonment. 
I agree. Yet, Professor Grimes's proposed remedy, while 
it points in the right direction, seems to me excessive. He 
urges that the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") 
publicly explain all settlements, explain all failures to act, 
describe near-miss theories that were not pursued even 
when they did act, and issue statements about the facts 
relevant to mergers that were abandoned. He also asks that 
the agencies release summary information with respect to 
parties, transactions and markets in which parties are 
active after each filing of a proposed merger by the merging 
parties. In light of the levels of disclosure already pursued 
by the two antitrust enforcement agencies, these rules seem 
to me unnecessary. 
Let me start by setting aside reasons that some have 
offered to curtail the level of transparency. Professor 
t Sheehy Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Of Counsel, 
Arnold & Porter; Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 1995-2001. 
1. Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51 
BUFF. L. REV. 937 (2003). 
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Grimes notes that there is a risk that confidential business 
information will be disclosed in the process of explaining 
decisions. But that should not be controlling. The agency 
staff can be careful to explain its actions or inactions 
without breaching confidentiality rules. Perhaps disclosure 
of reasons why enforcement action was not taken will be 
cited later by defenders of a transaction, but that is no 
reason not to disclose reasons for enforcement decisions. If 
the first decision was wrong, the agency has a responsibility 
to admit it; if the facts are different, the agency has a 
responsibility to explain. Finally, there is no reason to fear 
that publication of reasons for decisions, which is already 
going on at an increasing pace, will politicize enforcement 
decisions. 
The primary reason why an absolute requirement of 
explanations of all decisions is inappropriate is that it 
would be a substantial and rarely worthwhile resource 
commitment. Imagine a situation in which an enforcement 
agency has the following choice: it can assign staff lawyers 
and economists to support an enforcement action against an 
illegal transaction, or it can assign the same staff lawyers 
and economists to explain a dozen decisions not to act, 
where the explanation follows inextricably from published 
guidelines or prior cases, and where explanations of reasons 
not to challenge add little or nothing to a public 
appreciation of enforcement priorities. Rather than absolute 
rules, I believe that explanations of agency decisions, which 
are already frequently available, should continue to be left 
to the discretion of the agencies-with these general 
policies reviewable by Congress, the press and the academic 
community. 
Why not a rule requiring some statement of reasons 
why the FTC sued or settled, reasons why it failed to act, or 
an explanation of theories that may have been relevant to a 
transaction but were not pursued by the FTC? In this 
review, I will concentrate on the policies and experiences of 
the FTC-an agency with which I am more familiar than 
the Department of Justice. Professor Grimes appreciates 
that FTC disclosure policies provide more information than 
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. I will leave it to others to 
explain why Department of Justice policies, particularly in 
the area of criminal enforcement, deserve to be different. 
First, Professor Grimes recognizes that the FTC offers 
explanations. The FTC in recent years has offered 
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explanations that Grimes characterizes as "minimally 
adequate" in connection with 56% of its merger enforcement 
decisions. 2 In other instances, the Commission may not offer 
an explanation but one or two FTC Commissioners, 
disappointed with the failure to act, or the scope of action, 
may offer explanatory dissenting opinions. Thus, we are 
talking about some degree of additional transparency in a 
little more than 40% of Commission enforcement actions. 
Second, in an increasing number of matters, the 
Commission does offer extensive explanations when it 
believes Congress, academics or the private sector would 
profit. For example, when the Commission decided not to 
challenge a merger between Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas, a deal that had important international 
consequences, it explained its reasons.3 When America 
Online C'AOL") sought to merge with Time Warner, the 
Commission required restructuring before passing on this 
deal, but did not pursue vertical anticompetitive theories 
(an example of a linear-miss II theory).4 The Commission 
explained why vertical theories were inappropriate.5 In its 
enforcement action against record companies for minimum 
price arrangements on compact disc sales, the Commission 
thought it important to pursue a rule of reason rather than 
a per se approach and explained why.6 Finally, in the recent 
Cruise Lines decision involving a transaction between 
several cruise lines, which the Commission failed to 
2. [d. at 940. 
3. See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. 
Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. Varney Concerning The Boeing 
Co.lMcDonnell Douglas Corp., F.T.C. File No. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opaJI997/07Iboeingsta.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003); 
Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga Concerning The Boeing Co., 
F.T.C. File No. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997), at http://www.ftc.gov/opaJI997/07/ma. 
htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003). 
4. See America Online, Inc. and Time Warner, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-
3989,2001 WL 410712, at *1 (F.T.C. Apr. 17,2001); Statement of Commissioner 
Mozelle W. Thompson Concerning American Online, Inc. and Time Warner, 
Inc., F.T.C. File No. 001-0105 (Apr. 17,2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001l04/ 
aoltwthompsonstmt.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003). 
5. See America Online, Inc., 2001 WL 410712, at *1. 
6. See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Sheila F. 
Anthony, Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, and Thomas B. Leary 
Concerning Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.; Universal Music & Video 
Distribution Corp., and UMB Recordings, Inc.; and Capitol Records, Inc., d.b.a. 
"EMI Music Distribution" et aI., F.T.C. File No. 971-0070 (Aug. 30, 2000), at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/musicstatement.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003). 
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challenge, a majority offered an extremely extensive 
explanation of its policies in light of the facts of that 
transaction and dissenting Commissioners explained why 
the majority, in their view, was wrong. 7 Those were 
exceptional enforcement matters and deserved special 
comment. 
Third, the Commission of course could do more, but 
there is a serious question whether all transactions that are 
not challenged deserve a full exposition. Investigation may 
show that the relevant product market is broader than 
initially anticipated, so that the combined market share of 
the merging parties is 4% or 5%. What could an explanation 
of that transaction add to what is already in the horizontal 
merger guidelines? 
Finally, comparisons to other agencies are a bit 
misleading. At its high water mark, the Federal Trade 
Commission reviewed almost 5,000 mergers per year 
predisclosed under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.8 The total is 
far less today but still more than the number reviewed by 
other agencies. Because of filing thresholds, the European 
Union reviews a small fraction of U.S. totals. The Federal 
Communications Commission examines only media mergers 
and transactions and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission examines only transactions in the energy 
sector of the economy. 
CONCLUSION 
Transparency in connection with government 
enforcement is essential. My only reservation about 
Professor Grimes's proposals is that they appear to 
7. See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Royal 
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.IP&O Princess Cruises pIc and Carnival Corp.IP&O 
Princess Cruises pIc, F.T.C. File No. 021-0041 (Oct. 4, 2002), at http://www.ftc. 
gov/os/2002/10/cruisestatement.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2003); Dissenting 
Statement of Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony and Mozelle W. Thompson, 
Concerning Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.IP&O Princess Cruises pIc and 
Carnival Corp.IP&O Princess Cruises pIc, F.T.C. File No. 021-0041 (Oct. 4, 
2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/cruisedissent.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 
2003). 
8. See William J. Baer, Report from the Bureau of Competition (1999), 
Address Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Spring Meeting 
1999, Federal Trade Commission Committee (Apr. 15, 1999) ("In Fiscal Year 
1998, the Commission and the Antitrust Division reviewed a record 4,728 
[Hart-Scott-Rodinol filings, over three times as many as six years earlier."). 
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establish unduly strict requirements for publication of 
reasons why an agency acted or failed to act. Given the 
substantial resource commitments that would be triggered 
by such rules, I would leave the matter to the discretion of 
the agencies with careful oversight by Congress. If Congress 
supports a policy of more extensive and fuller explanations, 
it should be asked to consider making additional resources 
available for that purpose in its budget review. 
